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Abstract 
We use earnings distribution approach (EDA) to investigate whether and why Islamic banks manage 
reported earnings. First findings confirm the assumption that Islamic banks manage earnings to avoid 
reporting losses (with statistical tests) and earnings decreases (with visual evidence but without statistical 
tests). However, earning management phenomenon is not as obvious in Islamic banking institutions as in 
other non-Islamic institutions. That is, Islamic banking institutions practice earnings manipulations but not 
as well as non-Islamic institutions. Additionally findings show that prospect theory can explain the 
trade-off between risk and return, i.e., Islamic banks above the earnings threshold are found to be risk 
averters while banks below the earnings threshold are found to be risk seekers. Therefore, we have accepted 
the hypothesis that prospect theory explains Islamic banks’ motivation in managing earnings to exceed 
thresholds.   
Keywords: Earnings Management, Earnings Distribution Approach (EDA), Prospect Theory, Islamic 
Banking Institutions. 
1. Introduction 
Banking industry is shown to be of a great importance to national, regional, and global economy. However, 
banks around the world are found to have managed their earnings (Shen and Chih, 2005). Earnings 
management
1
 restricts investor’s capacity to forecast banks’ future cash flow correctly based on the current 
financial information. So, it increases information asymmetry problems between banks and investors and 
reduces banking sector stability. The latest global financial crisis has shown that information dispersal in 
banking industry is not enough and information asymmetry problems are very severe. One remarkable 
phenomenon is that Islamic banking institutions were not brutally affected by the financial crises period 
(Anouar M., 2011). Thus, it is an interesting and important question to examine whether Islamic banks are 
less likely to manage their earnings. 
Earnings management has attracted the attention of academic researchers in accounting and finance, 
especially in recent years after the many accounting scandals in prominent companies such as Enron and 
WorldCom1 (Ibrahim S. S., 2005; Giroux, 2004). However Islamic banks and other Islamic financial 
institutions are often neglegted from earnings management research because their characteristics differ 
fundamentally from other conventional institutions. There have been prior empirical studies investigating 
earnings management by Islamic banks. These studies have focused on loan loss provisions (LLPs)
2
 as a 
                                                        
1In the context of this study, we refer to earnings management as manipulation of earnings that is designed to serve 
management’s purposes. Whether it is fraudulent is not a consideration. Also, whether it is harmful to investors and 
others is not a consideration.  
2In accounting literature, the focus of empirical studies on earnings management in banks is on loan loss provisions 
(LLPs). Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are a relatively large accrual for commercial banks and therefore have a 
significant impact on earnings and regulatory capital of banks. The purpose of these provisions is to adjust banks’ loan 
loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. However, bank managers also have incentives to 
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tool of earnings management. They do not seem to find evidence consistent with this. The incentives for 
Islamic bank managers to smooth income though LLPs are not clearly present(Sundararajan, 2005; Ismail 
and Be Lay 2002; Shahimi et al. 2005; Zoubi and Al-Ghazali, 2007; Anouar M. 2011). They have 
fundamentally different accrual processes that are not likely to be captured well by LLPs models (Abdul 
Ghafar and Shahida, 2006).  
The aim of this paper is to study earnings management and the related issues of Islamic banking institutions 
across 27 countries. We explore the following two questions. First, do earnings management a phenomenon 
in Islamic banking institutions? We answer this question by providing graphical and statistical evidence 
similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). Our second question is related to the 
incentives of Islamic banks to manage earnings. Prospect theory, based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
is used to explain this behavior (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Shen and Chih 2005). 
The first finding of this study confirms the fundamental premise and thus supports the assumption that 
earnings are managed to avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. The second finding concerning the 
earnings management incentives shows that the prospect theory appears to be a good justification of 
Islamic banks’ behaviour in managing earnings to exceed thresholds.  
This research study is of interest because Islamic banking industry is developing with fast growing rates 
which attract the attention of researchers and potential investors all over the world
3
. Moreover it is, to my 
knowledge, the first one that uses the earnings distribution approach and the prospect theory to study earnings 
management behaviour in Islamic banks context and in an international perspective. Many studies investigate 
earnings management practices conducted by industrial and commercial firms. Few of them are devoted to 
earnings management in banking industry and are generally interested in conventional banks to identify these 
practices while emphasizing the relation between provisions policy and net income. Those related to Islamic 
banks are nonexistent and report mixed results. Our contribution lies in testing the premise of earnings 
management in the milieu of Islamic banks for a large group of countries. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic concepts 
and principles of Islamic banking, followed by a brief review of the literature relevant to the current study. 
Next, we develop the research hypotheses, then we discuss the methodology pursued for empirical research. 
After that, we present the results and provide some additional analyses. The final section is concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future research.  
2. Basic Concepts and Principles of Islamic Banking 
Islamic banks are financial institutions governed by Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia'ah) which make their 
functioning different from conventional banks. Sharia'ah applied by Islamic banks prohibits giving or 
receiving interest in all transactions. They structure transactions so as to avoid paying or receiving interest. 
As a consequence, Islamic financing is not centered only on credit value and ability to reimburse the loans 
and interest; instead the value and profitability of a project are the most important criteria of Islamic 
financing while the ability to reimburse the loan is sub-segmented under profitability (Azam Ahamed , 
2008). 
One of the unique and most important characteristics of Islamic banks is that the assimilation of ethical and 
moral values with its banking operation. The ethical and moral consideration of Islamic banks cannot be 
removed and their behavior should be consistent with the moral and ethical standards laid down by the 
Islamic Shari’ah (Azam Ahamed , 2008). Due to the increasing importance given to ethics nowadays4  and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
use these loan loss provisions to manage earnings and regulatory capital as well as to communicate or ‘signal’ private 
information about future prospects (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999).  
3 According to World Business Online (2011), “Islamic finance assets around the world are expected to climb 33% 
from their 2010 levels to $1.1 trillion by the end of 2012, boosted by the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings and 
dissatisfaction with conventional finance in the wake of the global debt crisis… Islamic banking in MENA is expected 
to grow over the next five years at a compound annual rate of 20%, compared to less than 9% for conventional banks” 
(World Business Online, 2011). 
4 See: Elias, (2004); Patrice Ge l´inas, (2007) and Haniffa and Hudaib, (2007) 
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the importance that Islamic banking gives to moral beliefs and society it is continuing to grow rapidly. The 
Sharia’a law is driven by value and good for mankind, hence gaining popularity not only among Muslims 
but also from non-Muslim communities. New investment models and business tools are being developed by 
Islamic financial experts which are not only hundred per cent sharia’a compliant but also very profitable. 
According to industry estimates, “Islamic finance assets around the world are expected to climb 33% from 
their 2010 levels to $1.1 trillion by the end of 2012, boosted by the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings
5
 
and dissatisfaction with conventional finance in the wake of the global debt crisis… Islamic banking in 
MENA is expected to grow over the next five years at a compound annual rate of 20%, compared to less 
than 9% for conventional banks” (World Business Online, 2011) 
The balance between ethical and material requirement had encouraged Islamic banks to finance their 
investments using mainly equity financing and customers' deposit account while conventional banks use both 
debt and equity to finance their investments (Karim and Ali; 1989). In addition, unlike the conventional 
banks, the financing of Islamic banks are restricted to useful goods and services and abstain from financing 
pork, alcoholic and tobacco or morally unacceptable services such as gambling and pornography, irrespective 
of whether or not such goods and services are legal or not in a given country (Azam Ahamed , 2008).  
Another fundamental characteristic which forms the basis for the development of Islamic banks is the 
relationship with depositors. Investing their funds jointly with customers on profit/loss sharing 
arrangements, Islamic banks become partners and they share risk with both depositors and shareholders. 
They deal with their customers on investment grounds rather than a pre-determined fixed interest rate. They 
invest the money of their depositors on high profitable projects after going through a strategic analysis in 
order to give a considerable return to their depositors.  
Thus in Islamic banking industry, each bank will try to out-perform other banks if it wants to attract funds 
from investors. And the ultimate result is that a high return on investments for the investors, which is 
unlikely in a conventional bank where it deals with their depositors on a pre-determined fixed interest rate. 
This paper is investigating whether such deposit attraction practice and high return objective affect the 
behavior of Islamic banks in earnings management. 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that earnings management is the alteration of 
firms-reported economic performance by insiders to either ‘‘mislead some stakeholders’’ or to ‘‘influence 
contractual outcomes’’. Leuz et al. (2003,) define it as being the "alteration of firms' reported economic 
performance by insiders either to mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes". 
In recent years, it has received considerable attention from regulators, practitioners and academicians. A 
wide variety of models was thus used to capture earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols, 
2000, 2002; Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 2005). 
According to McNichols (2000), there are three main approaches that are used to test earnings management 
hypothesis: 
 The total accruals approach, as in Healy (1985), DE Angelo (1986) and Jones (1991). It is to 
identify discretionary accruals based on the relation between total accruals and hypothesized 
explanatory factors.  
 The specific accrual approach, as in McNichols and Wilson (1988), Moyer (1990), Petroni (1992), 
Beaver and McNichols (1998), Penalva (1998), Nelson (2000) and Petroni et al. (2000). It is to 
study single accrual rather than total accruals. The researchers have priors that management's 
discretion is likely to be reacted in a specific accrual or set of accruals. 
                                                        
5 Egypt, for instance, has raised the possibility of issuing a sovereign Sukuk (Islamic bond), while Tunisia and Libya 
have indicated that sharia-compliant banking will probably play a role in their financial systems after their changes of 
regime this year (World Business Online; December 5, 2011).  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 3, No 3, 2012 
 
 
91 
 The earnings distribution approach as in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999). It consists in investigating the statistical properties of earnings. Its focus is on 
the behavior of earnings around a specified benchmark, such as zero or a  prior quarter's earnings, 
to test whether the incidence of amounts above and below the benchmark are distributed smoothly, 
or reveal discontinuities due to the use of discretion. 
It is frequently tested whether companies are managing their earnings not to descent below significant 
thresholds (such as zero earnings or zero earnings increases) or to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) are looking at the distribution of net income and changes therein and 
provide conclusive evidence that firms systematically avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses. 
Furthermore, they find that the tendency to avoid earnings decreases rises with the number of preceding 
years of consecutive earnings increases. Besides, they document that for publicly-held firms (1) small 
losses are reported less often than small profits; and (2) small declines in earnings are reported less often 
than small increases in earnings.  
Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that firms manage reported earnings for three major purposes, namely, to 
avoid losses, to avoid earnings decreases, and to meet analysts' earnings expectations. 
Xue (2004) empirically tested whether firms manage earnings to exceed thresholds to communicate firms’ 
future performance. He finds that not every firm benefits from doing so, this is because managing current 
period earnings to exceed threshold reduces future period earnings. In addition results revealed that capital 
market recognizes the information contents of such earnings management activities and rationally 
incorporate into the price settings. 
Beatty et al. (1999) had tried to understand the earnings management patterns observed in public firms by 
comparing the earnings streams of privately-held versus publicly-held banks during the time period 
1987-1998. They find that, “relative to public banks, private banks report: (i) more small losses and less 
small profits; (ii) more small declines and less small increases in earnings; and (iii) shorter strings of 
consecutive earnings increases”. For them, the differences in earnings streams suggest first that managers 
of public banks are using accounting discretion to manage their earnings. 
Ma (1988) documents that regulated industry are more likely to manage their earnings to comply with 
sufficient levels of ratios such as return on equity return or on assets, the capitalization rate of earnings and 
changes in the results, which investors, financial analysts, bankers and regulators use as measures to asses 
the quality of management that surrogates profitability. Such measures open then a window for managers to 
engage in practices like smoothing earnings.  
Likewise Kim et al. (1998) and Shrieves et al. (2003) ascertain that since regulated industries are of 
importance to the financial stability of the economy, governments represented by regulators (central banks) 
scrutinise the use of earnings management to maintain the economic stability and avoid any crunch that 
affect the national economy. To preserve and protect national and global economies, the regulatory capital 
requirement incentivized bank managers to manage their earnings and modify results to meet this minimum 
requirement, which is attainable through managing the biggest discretionary accruals in banks’ expense 
account, the loan loss provisions. 
Wahlen (1994), Bhat (1996), Hasan and Wall (2004) and Gonzalez (2008) empirical research studies 
proved the existence of earning management in regulated industries and that bank managers smooth their 
earnings upward (downward) when the results are lower (higher) due to asymmetry information on risk 
default. 
Beatty et al. (2002) state additional evidence supporting the notion that, for the bank 
industry, the discontinuities around zero are due to earnings management. 
Managing earnings for meeting earnings targets perhaps documents the most studies in the literature of 
earnings management. Firms have incentives to manage earnings for at least the following earnings targets: 
 to avoid reporting an earnings decrease; 
 to avoid reporting a loss, and; 
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 to avoid missing analysts’ earnings expectation.  
While the above studies provide convincing evidence of earnings management, their samples typically 
exclude Islamic banking institutions and firms in other regulated Islamic industries, such as Islamic 
insurance institutions and Waqf institutions. Some empirical studies dedicated to Sharia’a compliant 
regulated industries (Sundararajan, 2005; Ismail and Be Lay 2005; Zoubi and Al-Khazali, 2007), document 
the existence of income smoothing hypothesis. Income smoothing practices in Islamic banks is validated by 
using a sample of 55 commercial banks and 10 Islamic banking institutions from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council region. Return paid smoothing activity from the profit loss sharing investment accounts is 
confirmed on a sample of 14 Islamic banks in 8 countries. 
Similarly, Shahimi et al. (2005) have underlined that the Islamic banks operating in Malaysia practice 
income smoothing through loan loss provisioning as well as conventional banks on a panel of 15 
commercial banks providing Islamic banking products and services over the time period 1996-2003. 
Inconsistent with the latter, Ismail et al. (2002), argue that managers routinely employ earnings 
management for unscrupulous reasons and document that Shari’ah “discourage opportunistic behaviours,” 
which prevent Muslim managers in Islamic banks to practice earnings management in comparison to 
non-Muslim managers. Deploying a sample pertaining ten commercial banks that offer Islamic banking 
windows from 1998 to 2001, they document that managers did not use loan loss provision to manage 
capital and earnings.  
Anour M. (2011) stated that Islamic banks are less likely to engage in smoothing earnings management due 
to the moral and ethical values that Sharia’a stresses upon. Furthermore, he remarked that Islamic banks 
objectives are to serve owners and depositors of the bank and most importantly to socially and 
economically improve and support societies.  
Hanifa (2007) stated that “Islamic banks, as economic and social institutions, must portray aspects of those 
five traits
6, drawn from both Sharia’a and business ethics, in their activities...Islamic Banks have been 
entrusted with the safekeeping of depositors’ savings and shareholders’ capital and putting these funds to 
good use. Hence, they are not only financially accountable but also morally accountable for their business 
behaviour.” As such, he expected Islamic banks to operate and to provide returns within Sharia ‘a 
principles/ ideals, and to communicate clearly the in their annual reports “commitments to fulfil contractual 
relationships with various stakeholders via contract (uqud) statements.” Similarly, Muthalib et al. (2005) 
argue that Islamic principles “discourage opportunistic behaviors” then Muslim managers- who are 
expected to be believers imbued with piety and righteousness- are expected to practice less earnings 
management than non-Muslim managers. 
Empirically, the results of previous research are mixed on the earnings management practices by Islamic 
banks and are controversial about the use of loan loss provisions. Indeed, prior literature is not unanimous 
on the use of such a technique by Islamic banks as the main tool of smoothing income. Moreover, some 
research studies that validate this hypothesis employ data from commercial banks that provide Islamic 
product and not full flagged Islamic banks data (Shahimi et al., 2005). Full flagged Islamic banks business 
activity is not based on credits but, as we have said, they act in accordance with revenue-sharing principles, 
and structure transactions so as to avoid paying or receiving interest. 
The results are thus doubtful since the research studies did not consider Islamic banks specificities but they 
replicated the LLP non-relevant technique approved as the main earnings management tool for 
conventional banks to investigate this practice Islamic banks. Also using data from commercial offering 
Islamic products and services is inappropriate since these banks are not considered Islamic banking 
institutions. Consequently to investigate the earnings management practice in Islamic bank context we need 
                                                        
6 For Haniffa (2007) “there are five distinctive features that differentiate Islamic Banks (IBs) from their competitors 
(conventional banks): (a) underlying philosophy and values; (b) provision of interest-free products and services; (c) 
restriction to Islamically acceptable deals; (d) focus on developmental and social goals; and (e) subjection to additional 
reviews by the Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB).” 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 3, No 3, 2012 
 
 
93 
to adopt another approach and to use a larger sample of only full-flagged Islamic banks and not 
conventional banks Islamic windows. 
For regulated firms, conflicting incentives to report lower earnings or decreases in earnings take place at 
whatever time there are economic benefits from reporting lower earnings to regulators (Burgstahler and 
Dichev_s, 1997; Ma (1988). For Islamic banking institutions, incentives to avoid losses or earnings 
decreases may be (negatively) linked to (the extent of) regulatory oversight. Aside from this, there are three 
more reasons why Islamic banks have special incentives to manage earnings, relative to the general industry, 
and thus it is worthwhile to test if earnings management exists in the Islamic banking industry (Shen and 
Chih, 2005). 
 First in order to keep investment account holders (IAHs) from losing confidence in Islamic banks, 
Islamic banks have a strong incentive to prevent their earnings from being negative. 
 Second, Islamic bank insiders - like conventional banks- have a high incentive to hide asset 
substitution behavior through earnings management
7
 (Shen and Chih, 2005).  
 Lastly, Islamic banks, like other conventional banks, are highly regulated firms, whose capital 
adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, etc. are strictly regulated. Thus, earnings management is one of the 
management skills that Islamic banks may adopt to avoid violating regulations (Shen and Chih, 
2005). 
The need to comply with reasonable levels of these ratios could lead Islamic banks as well as their 
conventional competitor to manage their results “as investors associate high volatility of returns with a 
higher risk” (Ma 1988). 
Therefore, we expect that Islamic banks will behave in the same way as conventional banks with earnings 
management i.e. they are managing their earnings not to descent below vital thresholds: zero earnings or 
zero earnings increases. Accordingly, our testable hypotheses (in alternative form) can be stated as follows:  
H1: Islamic bank managers seek to avoid losses.  
H2: Islamic bank managers seek to avoid earnings decreases. 
To investigate the significance of the hypothesized avoidance of losses and earnings decreases, we use 
Burgstahler and Dichevs (1997) statistical test. The only assumption of this test is the smoothness of the 
cross-sectional distributions of earnings levels and earnings changes in the absence of earnings 
management. 
4. Methodological Issues and Analytical Models 
4.1 Sample Selection and Variables Measurement  
Our data are obtained from the Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information (IBIS) Database, 
which contains up to ten years of historical financial data from annual reports of Islamic banking 
institutions around the world. To be included in the sample, a bank must have income statement and 
balance sheet information for at least two consecutive years
8
.  
We analyze unconsolidated Islamic bank financial statements and additional reports, taken from the IBIS 
database. “This IRTI9 portal is targeted at the community of researchers and finance professionals working 
in the area of Islamic economics and finance. It seeks to provide comprehensive data and information on 
the activities of Islamic finance institutions, up-to-date research and literature. It provides Islamic banks 
database along with tools for online analysis and download. It also features recent research activities 
                                                        
7Morgan (2002) also says that: ‘‘. . . uncertainty over the banks stems from their assets, loans and trading assets in 
particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks_ high leverage compounds the uncertainty 
over their assets; their assets present bankers with ample opportunities for risk or asset substitution, and their high 
leverage inclines them to do so.’’   
8 since we scale earnings data by lagged assets 
9 Islamic Research and Training Institute 
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conducted by IRTI.”10 
There are 137 Islamic banks in the original sample. We omitted 6 banks that have lack of data, where data 
is available for one year only. We omitted also 4 banks with missing data for at least one variable used in 
the later analysis, one bank without the needed consecutive information, and one bank without data for the 
study period. The final sample had 125 Islamic banks consisting of 1244 bank-year observations, across 27 
countries and for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009. We investigate two earnings variables. One is earnings 
change and the other is earnings level. For the earnings change variable, there are 551 bank-year 
observations and for the earnings level variable, there are 693 bank-year observations.  
Annual net distributable earnings are used to measure our first threshold, which is avoiding losses. Annual 
net distributable earnings changes are defined as net earnings in year t minus net earnings in year t-1 are 
used to measure our second threshold, which is avoiding earnings decreases. We deflate earnings levels and 
earnings changes by beginning-of-the-year total assets for the sake of reducing the problem of 
heteroscedasticity (Mard, 2004)
11
. Hence, for every Islamic banking institution and for every exercise of 
the period (2000–2009), we calculated the following ratios: 
Net earnings t  / Total assets (t-1) 
 (Net earnings t – Net earnings (t-1)) / Total assets (t-2) 
Table 1 presents the number of bank-year observations per variable as well as descriptive statistics for the 
sample banks. 
Table1. here 
Our analysis is per consequence based on a micro panel of annual supervisory bank-level data for 125 
Islamic banks for the years 2000 through 2009. Owing to lack of data and mergers during the observed time 
period, the panel is unbalanced and consists of 1244 bank-year observations. A feebleness of this dataset is 
its moderately small sample size which may make our conclusion more doubtful relative to that presented 
by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). However, the relatively small sample size 
may also make our results more significant since there must be a strong effect for patterns to emerge to the 
level of statistical significance. It is evident that there are some outliers. Nonetheless, we do not omit them 
as our emphasis is on the distribution around the zero threshold, which is not affected by the outliers. 
The income statement in Islamic banks as presented in the IBIS database is divided into four major sections, 
namely, operating income, non-operating income, net profit for the year and total distributable profit. 
Operating income includes revenue and expenses arising from operations such as income from financing 
and investments activities and sums paid to depositors (investment accounts). Total non operating income, 
which follows operating income, includes revenues and expenses arising from sources other than from 
business operations such as fee for funds managed on fee basis, fees and commissions for banking services, 
net income from foreign exchange dealings, profit from subsidiary and associated companies and all other 
income. Other income or loss items, except extraordinary items, should be included to arrive at net profit 
for the year. Total distributable profit follows net profit for the year and includes extraordinary items. We 
have studied earnings management of total distributable profit. The results are generally consistent for this 
measure of earnings. 
4.2 Research Design on Earnings Management: Discontinuity in Distribution of Earnings 
The extant literature suggests that firms tend to manipulate accounting numbers to achieve certain earnings 
thresholds. To focus on this tendency at the level of the Islamic banking' practices, we examine earnings 
management by employing the earnings distributions approach (EDA). This method, was developed by 
Burgstahler and Dichev in 1997, “and since then, a substantial volume of new research has applied this 
                                                        
10 See: www.ibisonline.net 
11 In this frame, several approaches were used in the relative accounting and financial literature. Note, for instance, the 
market value, the accounting value and sales or total assets (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997), p. 102 (Anis Ben Amar and 
Ezzeddine Abaoub 2010) 
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methodology to alternative earnings thresholds and in different operational settings" (Holland & Ramsay, 
2003).They recommend undergoing a statistical test, which, under the hypothesis of earnings management 
absence, indicates that the empirical distributions of earnings levels, earnings changes and earnings 
surprises are relatively smooth. In fact, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al (1999) assume 
that, at some thresholds, managers have strong incentives to engage in earnings management. For example, 
managers may want to avoid a loss or negative earnings growth, and they may also want to meet, or surpass, 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. They examine the distribution of reported earnings around these points 
(thresholds). If there is no earnings management, the distribution around these points should be smooth. 
However, consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, they find that there is a 
higher-than-expected frequency of firms presenting a little positive earnings (or earnings growth) and a 
lower-than-expected frequency of firms presenting a little negative earnings (or earnings growth). 
EDA constitutes an innovative approach to testing for earnings management which does not have to 
estimate (potentially noisy) discretionary accruals (Q. Yu et al, 2006). Instead, it examines the distribution 
of reported earnings for abnormal discontinuities around certain earnings benchmark (threshold). This is 
particularly meaningful for a study of Islamic banking institutions because most Islamic banks were created 
and provide financial data after 2000. This short history makes time-series-based accrual estimation 
difficult (Q. Yu et al, 2006).  
The main purpose of this section is to investigate whether Islamic banking institutions manage reported 
earnings to keep away from decreases in earnings and losses. To achieve this purpose, we first proceed by 
examining a graphical distribution of reported earnings around key earnings thresholds to observe 
discontinuities in the distribution. Second, we use Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) statistical test to 
demonstrate and test for discontinuities in the distribution. 
4.2.1 Test of the existence of earnings management 
4.2.1.1 Graphical Evidence 
To check the existence of earnings management to avoid losses, we present graphical evidence in the form 
of histograms of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of scaled earnings. Earnings 
management to avoid losses is likely to be reflected in cross-sectional distributions of earnings in the form 
of unusually low occurrences of small losses and unusually high occurrences of small positive earnings. If 
managers are trying to avoid losses, we expect to observe unusually few observations immediately to the 
left of zero and an unusually large number of observations immediately to the right of zero. 
To examine the existence of earnings management to avoid earnings decrease, we construct historical 
histogram of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of scaled earnings changes. The 
distributions of the change in earnings will not display a normal curve if banks managers do earnings 
management in order to meet or exceed this threshold. More explicitly, if managers are trying to avoid 
decreases in earnings, we expect to observe unusually few observations immediately to the left of zero, and 
an unusually large number of observations immediately to the right of zero. 
4.2.1.2 Statistical Evidence 
The statistical test, as developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),consists of making the difference 
between the actual number of observations and the number of expected ones in an interval i (immediately to 
the right and to the left of zero) divided by the estimated standard deviation of this difference. Specifically, it 
is expressed in this paper as follows:  
DSi (standardised difference) = (AQi -EQi)/SDi 
Where:  
 AQi: the actual number of observations falling in interval i, 
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 EQi: the expected number of observations in interval i. The expected number of observations 
in any given interval of the distribution is the average of the number of observations in the 
adjacent intervals
12
. In particular, EQi = (AQi-1 + AQi+1)/2. 
  SDi: the estimated standard deviation of the difference between the actual and expected 
numbers of observations around interval i. In particular, SDi = [Npi(1 - pi) + (1/4)N(pi_1 + 
pi+1)(1 - pi_1 -pi+1)]
1/2
,  
Where, 
 N is the total number of observations in the sample;  
 pi is the proportion of the actual number of observations for interval i to the bank-years; 
namely pi = AQi/N; 
 pi-1=  AQi-1/N  
  pi+1 = AQi+1/N. 
The assessment of the significance of these statistics is performed against 1.96. The values of DS, which are 
equal or superior in absolute value to 1.645, indicate the evidence of earnings management to achieve 
thresholds. This cut-off point corresponds to a level of significance of 5% for a standardized normal 
distribution (Brown & Caylor, 2005). 
Based on Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) works as well as those of Brown and Caylor (2003), we consider 
a threshold with highly negative values of DS as being evidence of the existence of a more important 
earnings management. 
4.2.2 Results 
Figure1 is the distribution of earnings levels deflated by total assets (Earnings t / TA t-1). 
Figure1.here 
This figure is a histogram of the scaled earnings with histogram interval width of 0.0025 for the range -0.05 
to +0.085. The interval]-0.05, 0.085] includes 86.46% of the observations in the full sample. We also 
applied other intervals to ensure the robustness of our results and find very similar results as those reported 
in figure1. The scaled earnings levels less than -0.05 or greater than 0.085 are not shown here.  
Figure1. shows that the distribution is approximately a single-peaked bell-shaped distribution with an 
extreme irregularity near zero. Earnings slightly less than zero occur much less frequently than would be 
expected given the smoothness of the remainder of the distribution, and earnings slightly higher than zero 
occur much more frequently than would be expected
13
. This graphical result with sharp drop-at-zero 
suggests that Islamic bank managers have very strong incentive to avoid losses. 
Compared to previous studies in the U.S
14
., in Japan
15
 and other studies for conventional banks
16
, we 
observe a less abnormal discontinuity at zero in the earnings level distribution. The discontinuity at zero for 
figure1. is clear but less pronounced than the U.S. or Japanese firms and losses in earnings observed in 
conventional banks. 
Figure 2. shows the distribution of earnings changes scaled by total assets ((Earnings t - Earnings t-1)/TA t-2).  
Figure2. here 
                                                        
12 As explained in the footnote five of their paper, the average of the two immediate adjacent intervals is used as a 
proxy for the expectation. They have also tried two alternatives: 1) the expected number of observations is the average 
of the numbers in four adjacent intervals, and 2) the expected number is the average of the next-to-adjacent intervals. 
However, these alternatives do not produce qualitatively different results. 
13 One case for the interval [-0.0025;0[ and 39 cases for the interval [0;0.0025[. 
14 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, Figure 3, p.109). 
15 Suda and Shuto (2005, Figure 2, p.31). 
16 Shen an Chih (2005, Figure 2 p. 7-8-9). 
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This figure is a histogram of the scaled earnings change with histogram interval widths of 0.0005 for the 
range -0.0175 to +0.0225. this interval includes 68.06% of the observations in the full sample. The scaled 
earnings changes greater than 0.0225or less than -0.0175 are not shown here. Earnings management to 
avoid decreases in earnings is likely to be reflected in cross-sectional distributions of earnings in the form 
of unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and unusually high frequencies of small 
increases in earnings (Suda and Shuto 2005). 
Figure2. shows a bell-shaped distribution with a small irregularity near zero but without a well pronounced 
peak as in figure1. and other aforementioned studies. Moreover the number of cases with earnings increases 
(264 cases) is far superior than the number of cases with earnings decreases (111 cases). This graphical 
distribution with an irregularity near zero is consistent with earnings management to avoid decreases in 
earnings. 
The significance of this irregularities near zero is examined using Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) 
aforementioned statistical test. This test relies on the assumptions that the distribution of scaled earnings is 
relatively smooth. For smooth earnings distribution not affected by earnings management, the distribution 
of standardized differences should be approximately normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Therefore, the critical values for a one-tailed test of significance at levels of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 are, 
respectively, 1.645, 2.236, and 3.090 (Suda and Shuto 2005). 
The standardized differences for Figure1. and Figure2. are summarized in Table 2. The two left side 
columns report the values of test intervals: standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero 
and standardized difference for the interval immediately right of zero
17 . “Values for standardized 
differences for the remaining intervals” as presented in Table 2 include standardized differences for the 50 
and 76 intervals shown in each of the figures 1 and 2 respectively, and which are not adjacent to zero
18
. The 
four standardized differences omitted for each figure correspond to the two intervals adjacent to zero (test 
intervals), the most extreme negative and the most extreme positive interval. These most extreme intervals 
are undefined because there is an adjacent interval on only one side. So the expected number of 
observations in these intervals cannot be calculated. 
Table2. here 
For the earnings level variable, the standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero is 
–6.4221. These results suggest that there are significantly less observation than expected under smoothness 
in the interval immediately left of zero. In addition, these standardized differences are much larger in 
absolute magnitude than standardized differences for the remaining 50 intervals in table 3 the following 
largest standardized difference has a value of -1.42084. Thus, the statistical tests confirm that there is 
empirical irregularity to the left zero which is consistent with managerial action to avoid losses. 
The standardized difference for the interval immediately right of zero is 2.835651.This value is superior 
to1.645; the critical value at the significance level of 0.05. This result suggests that there is significantly 
more observation than expected under smoothness hypothesis in the interval immediately right of zero. 
                                                        
17
“The standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero is expected to provide the more 
powerful test of earnings management to avoid decreases in earnings and losses and should be considered 
the primary test for earnings management. Negative values represent evidence of earnings management to 
avoid decreases in earnings or losses. The standardized difference for the interval immediately right of zero 
provides an alternative, and probably less powerful, test of earnings management to avoid decreases in 
earnings or losses. Positive values represent evidence of earnings management to avoid decreases in 
earnings and losses” (Suda and Shuto 2005).  
18
 In order to test the statistical significance of earnings management at the mentioned thresholds, the 
whole distribution is divided into many small and equal intervals: 54 intervals for the earnings level 
variable and 80 intervals for the earnings change variable. 
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The standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero is expected to provide the more 
powerful test of earnings management to avoid decreases in earnings and losses and should be considered 
the primary test for earnings management (Suda and Shuto 2005). Thus we can conclude that there is a 
discontinuity around zero for earnings levels, which is suggestive of earnings management to avoid 
reporting losses. This evidence is totally supportive of our first hypothesis and validates the conclusions of 
our aforementioned graphical assessment based on the empirical distributions.  
For the earnings change variable, the statistical test does not confirm the significance of the irregularity 
near zero. The standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero is -1.10416, and the 
standardized difference for the interval immediately right of zero is 0.540297. Both values are not 
significant. This evidence is not supportive of our second hypothesis and does not corroborates 
the conclusions of our previous visual assessment based on the graphical distribution. Thus 
we can accept the null hypothesis that Islamic banks do not engage in earnings management to avoid 
earnings decreases.  
In sum, the results obtained from this section show a discontinuity around zero for levels and changes in 
earnings, which is suggestive of earnings management to avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. 
The relative magnitude of these standardized differences together with the visual graphical 
evidence suggest that the discontinuities around zero are of different relative size, higher 
for earnings levels. These results denote that Islamic banks are more committed to managing 
earnings for showing a positive earning than to manipulating financial results so that they show evidence of 
improvement. 
Our results, in general, are in line with the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), those of  Suda and 
Shuto 2005), those of Degeorge et al. (1999) and those of Shen and Chih (2005). Nevertheless, contrary to 
these research studies, our research does not provide statistical evidence of “account manipulation” that 
might allow for avoiding earnings decreases.  
In addition, results are consistent with the findings of Anouar M. (2011) who finds that Islamic banks are 
less likely to conduct earnings management as measured by both earnings loss avoidance and abnormal 
loan loss provisions. For example, he finds that Islamic banks are about 3% to 5% less likely to use 
earnings loss avoidance technique to manage their earnings compared to their conventional counterparts. In 
addition, he finds that the average discretionary loan loss provisions of Islamic banks are about 0.002 lower 
than that of non-Islamic Banks. 
The aforementioned results and the results of the current study are both statistically and economically 
significant, indicating that Islamic law (Shari’ah) may effectively impact bank managers’ financial 
reporting decision-making. Moreover, Islamic banks take into consideration the reputation costs when 
engaging in earnings management. They may have established their credibility in business community and 
social responsibility as well, including the credibility of financial information disclosed by these banks 
because conventional banks are more able to use best expertise and modern information technology to 
generate reliable and timely information compared to Islamic banks. Hence, the cost of engaging in 
earnings management will be higher for Islamic banks than conventional banks and other firms. Therefore, 
their concern about reputations may prevent Islamic banks from large earnings manipulation. 
4.3 Motivations of Earnings Management 
In addition to investigating whether there is any earnings management at the threshold, we also analyse the 
incentives for the earnings management. We try thus to test whether the prospect theory can provide an 
explanation for earnings management behavior in Islamic banking institutions. In fact Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) theoretically infer that prospect theory is a possible motivation 
for earnings management. Fiegenbaum (1990), Shu et al,(2002) and Shen and Chih (2005) proved this 
empirically in different contexts. 
Prospect theory is one of the eminent behavior theories useful in finance literature. It was developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and it applies psychological theory to explain individual’s behavior. The 
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theory highlights the role of reference point, or target level, in the examination of choice. Most individuals 
show mixtures of risk-seeking and risk-averting behavior when they face different return levels. There are 
four main hypotheses in the prospect theory regarding the form of the value function. First, reference point 
is a critical element. Second, individuals are averse to risk when outcomes are above reference point which 
denotes that the relationship between the risk and return is positive above the reference. Third, individuals 
are risk seeker when outcomes decrease below reference point which indicates that the relationship between 
the risk and return is negative below the reference point. And, fourth, the function of risk-taking behavior is 
steeper than the function of risk-averting behavior (Shu et al. 2002).  
In testing whether asymmetric risk–return association exists or not, we follow Fiegenbaum's (1990) 
approach to calculate return and risk
19
, which were proxied by means and standard deviation of bank scaled 
earnings (or scaled earnings changes), respectively. That is, we calculate mean (as ‘‘return’’) and standard 
deviation (as ‘‘risk’’) of scaled earnings (or scaled earnings changes) of each bank for the years 2000–2009. 
Banks that have five years of data, for this time period, were used in order to minimize the bias of the 
measures. This is because banks with less than five years-data may provide less reliable estimates (Shen 
and Chih, 2005).  
Banks are splited into:  
 ‘‘High earnings group’’: denotes banks with deflated earnings (or deflated earnings changes) 
higher than the threshold; zero deflated earnings level (or zero deflated earnings change).  
 ‘‘Low earnings group’’: consists of banks with earnings levels (or earnings changes) lower than 
earnings thresholds
20
.  
We use the Fiegenbaum's (1990) following model to regress ‘‘risk’’ on ‘‘return’’ for each group: 
riskj  =  αL + βL returnj + Ɛ j           if j   є    low earnings group (L);       (1) 
riskj  =  αH + βH returnj + Ɛ j           if j   є     high earnings group (H);     (2) 
βH > 0 > βL                                                              (3) 
│ βL │> │ βH │                                                           (4) 
Where: 
 j denotes bank,  
 L and H represent low and high earnings groups, respectively, 
 α is the constant term, and  
 β is the coefficient which measures the trade-off between risk and return. 
 
This model stipulates that, if prospect theory can explain the risk-return association, the sign on βL should 
be negative, the sign on βH should be positive, and the absolute value of βL must be grater than that of βH. 
That is, if we find βH > 0 > βL and │βL│> │βH│, then we can accept the hypothesis that the selected 
earnings thresholds (zero scaled earnings or zero scaled earnings change) are reference points 
corresponding to prospect theory (Fiegenbaum ,1990; Shen and Chih, 2005). 
                                                        
19 Fiegenbaum (1990) used data of 85 US industries to provide evidences on prospect theory. He divided sample 
companies into high and low groups according to their earnings (the reference point). After grouping, the relationship 
between risks and returns consist with what prospect theory stated: the high group has a positive relationship between 
risk and return while the low group has a negative relationship.  
20 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) did not provide a general rule to decide the target level which is a key 
component in testing the prospect theory (Shu et al 2002). Fiegenbaum (1990) uses median industry return 
to be the measurement of target level. The measurement of return he used was the average segments’ return 
on assets over the sample period. And for the risk measurement, he used the variance of segments’ return on 
assets for the same period of time.  
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Table 3 presents the results for the model. The earnings target is zero earnings in Panel A, while the 
earnings target is zero earnings changes in Panel B.  
Table3. here 
As in Panel A, banks in the ‘‘high earnings group’’ have a positive relation between risk and return 
(measured as βH) and are risk-averters. More specifically, coefficients were significantly positive (at p< 0. 
01). These results clearly represent that banks above the earnings threshold are risk-averters. For the below 
threshold group. coefficient βL was negative but statistically non-significant. These results represent that 
banks in the ‘‘low earnings group’’ have negative risk–return association and are risk-seekers. Finally, the 
value for below threshold is -0.210 while that above the threshold is 0.668. That is, we find │ βL │<│ βH│. 
Thus the data do not support the argument of Fiegenbaum (1990), since there is not a steeper association 
for risk–return relationships for below threshold banks, than for above threshold banks. However, given the 
technical characteristics of the methodology we use, the smaller number of observations in each sub-sample 
might affect the precision of the assessment. The statistics displayed in Table 3, on the number of 
observations, seem to give some support to this potential explanation for such an unexpected result. 
Panel B shows that banks in the ‘‘high earnings change group’’ have positive risk–return association 
(measured as βH); coefficient was significantly positive (at p < 0. 01). Similar to the results of Panel A, this 
result represents that banks above the earnings threshold are risk-averters. Coefficient βL corresponding the 
below threshold group was negative and statistically significant (at p < 0.10). These results indicate that 
banks in the ‘‘low earnings change group’’ have an inverse risk–return relation and are risk-seekers. Finally, 
the value for below threshold is -0.824 while for the above threshold it is 0.507. The ratio of almost 2 to 1 
clearly supports prospect theory characteristic which argues for a steeper association for risk-return 
relationships for below target performers (Fiegenbaum, 1990).  
Overall, our data on the Islamic banking industry provide some evidence that prospect theory can explain 
the trade-off between risk and return, i.e., banks above the earnings threshold are found to be risk averters 
while banks below the earnings threshold are found to be risk seekers. Therefore, we can accept the 
hypothesis that prospect theory explains Islamic banks’ motivation in managing earnings to exceed 
thresholds. These results support the empirical evidence stem from the graphical and 
statistical analyses, and reveal a new and intuitive interpretation for the discontinuities 
around zero in the earnings distribution. They are certainly an important contribution to 
our understanding of the determinants of such discontinuities. 
However, this result is not well pronounced as in other context. In fact, Fiegenbaum (1990), Shen and Chih, 
(2005) and Shu et al, (2002) respective results are all statistically significant; for the high earnings group as 
well as for the low earnings group. They provide strong evidence that prospect theory can explain the 
trade-off between two of the most researched parameters in evaluating organizations, namely, risk and 
return. In particular, organizations below their target level are found to be risk-lovers while organizations 
above their target level are risk-averters. Moreover, the below target trade-off was generally steeper than 
the above target with a median below to above slope ratio of about 3 to l in Fiegenbaum’s study (1990). 
The different results of this paper reveal the fact that earning management is not as pronounced in Islamic 
banking institutions as in other non-Islamic institutions. That is, Islamic banking institutions practice some 
earnings manipulations but not as well as non-Islamic institutions. Islamic Banks are less likely to conduct 
earnings management compared to non-Islamic banks (Anouar M., 2011)
21
. 
 5. Conclusion 
We investigate whether Islamic banks engage in earnings management to avoid losses and decreases in 
earnings. Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Gore et al. (2001), 
amongst others, we analyse the distribution of net earnings departing from the assumption that in the 
absence of earnings management, such a distribution will be smooth. Using earnings levels as our 
                                                        
21 See also Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Suda and Shuto (2005) and  Shen an Chih (2005). 
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variable, we find graphical and statistical evidence that there is an unusually high 
frequency of Islamic banks in earnings interval immediately to the right of zero and an 
unusually low frequency in that to the left. We take these unexpected frequencies as evidence 
that Islamic banks manage their earnings to avoid earnings losses. However, contrary to previous 
research studies, we do not find statistical evidence of “account manipulation” that might allow for 
avoiding earnings decreases. Moreover, the relative magnitude of the standardized differences 
together with the visual graphical evidence suggest that the discontinuities around zero 
are of different relative size, higher for earnings levels. These results denote that 
Islamic banks are more committed to managing earnings for showing a positive earning than to 
manipulating financial results so that they show evidence of improvement. 
Aside from this, we find some evidence that prospect theory can explain the trade-off between risk and 
return. Indeed, banks above the earnings threshold are found to be risk averters while banks below the 
earnings threshold are found to be risk seekers. 
These results suggest that earnings management with the aim of exceeding thresholds do exist to some extent 
in Islamic banking industry. However it is not as pronounced as in other non-Islamic institutions. That is, 
Islamic banking institutions practice some earnings manipulations but not as well as non-Islamic institutions. 
Islamic banks managers do not have strong incentive to avoid earnings decreases and losses relative to other 
firms especially the conventional banks. Islamic banks are less likely to conduct earnings management 
compared to non-Islamic banks. These findings can have some important implications for the Islamic banks 
regulators (namely International Association of Islamic Banks
22
) as well as standard setters (namely 
AAOIFI, IFSB
23
). 
The importance of the overall results is threefold. First, it adds to the literature that supports the 
discontinuities in the earnings distribution as being driven (at least partly) by earnings management; second, 
it highlights the role of special institutions’ earnings management incentives. The prospect theory we 
investigate, and the results we obtain, contribute to a better understanding of these incentives and how they 
work. Third, it contests the characteristic hypothesis in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that the incentives to 
undertake earnings management are similar in all firms. Our research does not show statistical evidence of 
earnings management for earnings decreases avoidance. 
This study however does not provide us with sufficient understandings regarding the extent and the scope 
of earnings management in the Islamic banking industry
24
. Furthermore, it is worth noting that sometimes 
banks might choose not to meet the zero earning threshold. Instead they would take larger losses in the 
current period and accumulate some earnings for the subsequent period
25
. If this happens, the earnings will 
not show up near the threshold and using the reported earnings distribution to uncover earnings may not 
identify such practice. Therefore, several directions can be taken in future research in order to detect any 
                                                        
22 “The International Association of Islamic Banks was founded in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, under the 
auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on the 7th of Ramadan 1397 (H) corresponding 
to August 21, 1977. The fundamental objective of the Association is to augment and enforce the ties and links 
amongst Islamic financial institutions and promote intra-cooperation and co-ordination. It is also designed to 
ascertain the institutions' Islamic observance and character in order to achieve their common and mutual 
goals.” (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia). 
23 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB): An international organization that issues guiding principles 
and standards within the banking, insurance and capital market sectors in order to promote stability in 
the Islamic financial services industry (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ifsb.asp#ixzz1g7DvrBP0) 
24
The disadvantages of the distribution approach, as pointed out by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Q. Yu et 
al, (2006), are that it captures neither the magnitude of earnings management nor the specific methods by 
which earnings are managed.  
25 “Taking a big bath”: This practice occurs when a firm magnifies its loss in an attempt to report a much higher 
earnings in the future. 
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earnings management practices and to measure the frequency and magnitude of earnings management in 
the Islamic banks. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Note to Table1: 
Scaled Earnings levels = Net earnings t / Total assets (t-1) 
Scaled Earnings changes = (Net earnings t – Net earnings (t-1)) / Total assets (t-2) 
 
Variables N Mean Median
uyuyh 
Std.Deviation 1Q 3Q Skewness Kurtosis 
Scaled Earnings 
changes 
551 0.0155 0.0049 0.1396 -0.0029 0.0181 11.855 211.532 
Scaled Earnings 
levels 
693 0.0255 0.0162 0.08429 0.0062 0.0352 -1.831 73.09 
Total 1244 0.041 0.0211 0.22389 0.0033 0.0533 10.024 284.622 
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Table2. Standardized differences for Figure 1 and Figure 2 
 Values for test intervals Values for standardized differences for intervals 
Standardized 
difference 
left of 0 
 
Standardized 
difference 
right of 0 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Figure 1(Scaled Earnings level) -6.4221 
 
2.835651 
 
-0.1117 
 
1.32261 
 
-6.4221 
 
2.835651 
 
Figure 2 (Scaled Earnings Change) -1.10416 
 
0.540297 
 
-0.1042 
 
1.029763 
 
-2.92404 
 
2.160615 
 
Note to Table2: 
DSi (Standardised Difference) = (AQi -EQi)/SDi 
AQi: the actual number of observations falling in interval i, 
EQi: the expected number of observations in interval i. The expected number of observations in any given 
interval of the distribution is the average of the number of observations in the adjacent intervals
26
. In 
particular, EQi = (AQi-1 + AQi+1)/2. 
SDi: the estimated standard deviation of the difference between the actual and expected numbers of 
observations around interval i. In particular, SDi = [Npi(1 - pi) + (1/4)N(pi_1 + pi+1)(1 - pi_1 -pi+1)]
1/2
. 
 
Table3. Motivation of earnings management: prospect theory 
Panel A 
Earnings threshold: earnings level = 0 
Panel B 
Earnings threshold: earnings change = 0 
High earnings 
group 
Low earnings 
group 
Total High earnings 
group 
Low earnings 
group 
Total 
βH N βL N - βH N βL N - 
0.668*** 68 -0.210 5 73 0.507*** 53 -0.824* 5 58 
Note to Table3: 
This table presents the results for the model. The earnings target is zero earnings in Panel A, while the 
earnings target is zero earnings changes in Panel B. 
riskj  =  αL + βL returnj + Ɛ j           if j   є    low earnings group (L);        
riskj  =  αH + βH returnj + Ɛ j           if j   є   high earnings group (H);      
j denotes bank, L and H represent low and high earnings groups, respectively,α is the constant term, and β 
is the coefficient which measures the trade-off between risk and return. 
*** p-value ≤ 0.01     * p-value≤ 0.1 
 
 
                                                        
26 As explained in the footnote five of their paper, the average of the two immediate adjacent intervals is used as a 
proxy for the expectation. They have also tried two alternatives: 1) the expected number of observations is the average 
of the numbers in four adjacent intervals, and 2) the expected number is the average of the next-to-adjacent intervals. 
However, these alternatives do not produce qualitatively different results. 
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Note to figure1: 
This figure is a histogram of the scaled earnings with histogram interval width of 0.0025 for the range -0.05 
to +0.085. The interval]-0.05, 0.085] includes 86.46% of the observations in the full 
sample.
 
Note to figure2: 
This figure is a histogram of the scaled earnings change with histogram interval widths of 0.0005 for the 
range -0.0175 to +0.0225. This interval includes 68.06% of the observations in the full sample. 
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